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On October 18, senior members of the Afghan Taliban claimed that some 
rounds of informal secret peace talks between their militant organisation 
and the Afghan government took place in September and earlier this month 
in Doha, Qatar. Since 2013 the Jihadists are running a political-diplomatic 
office in the Gulf state, ‘officially legitimised’ by the movement leadership 
and by the blessings of Washington. Describing itself as a liaison office 
(for the reestablishment) of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, the 
‘political’ Taliban representation is rather an additional reason for conflict 
then a contribution for a peaceful settlement. Nevertheless, the Doha office 
of the Jihadists hosted already similar peace negotiations in the past. But 
reports regarding the recent meetings are largely differing: The Taliban 
under its new leader Haibatullah Akhundzada explicitly dismissed their 
participation in the claimed negotiations, whereas the National Unity 
Government (NUG) of President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) Abdullah Abdullah neither confirmed nor denied the 
happenings of the meetings. The U.S., which was purportedly involved as 
well, merely expressed - as usual - their support for political solutions for 
Afghanistan, meaning an Afghan-led and Afghan-owned process 
negotiated settlement of the armed conflict between Afghan government 
and insurgency movements.
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The unwillingness to confirm officially the negotiations is not a surprise. All parties have their 
particular reasons to keep the talks secret. Earlier the NGU faced heavy criticism after striking 
a deal with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s organisation. Also known as the ‘butcher of Kabul’, 
Hekmatyar is responsible for massive human rights violations. Despite the authorities’ 
announcement that power-sharing is not part of the arrangement, he will most likely be 
granted with impunity for his acts. This could anger Afghans and therefore deepen the already 
existing rifts within the NUG. The Taliban have probably still to deal with the consequences 
of the internal power struggles and fissures which followed the official announcement of the 
death of the Taliban spiritual leader (Commander of the Faithful) Mullah Mohammed Omar. 
In his last years, he apparently favoured a political instead of a military solution for 
Afghanistan conflict. Subsequently, the Taliban movement found itself in a deep identity- 
crisis, not only because of the death of Omar but also because of the question: to fight or not 
to fight. Against this backdrop, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid sharply rejected 
reports of the talks, saying “they were propaganda aimed at creating divisions within the 
insurgency”.  
It is interesting to note that Islamabad, who was part of the four-nation initiative or 
Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG) of Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States and 
China for reconciliation in Afghanistan, is now obviously excluded from any ongoing talks 
between Taliban and NUG. The major reason is Pakistan’s ongoing support for terrorist 
activities in Afghanistan. Most of the latest terror attacks terror attacks on Afghan soil are 
either conducted by Pakistani-based terror groups (cross-border terrorism) and/or by (pro-
Pakistani) militant organisations based in Afghanistan. Both types of groups are enjoying 
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different kind of state-sponsorship: logistics and financial support, equipment, training 
facilities, and safe havens, granting of political and diplomatic protection.  
According to the Guardian, six Taliban commanders as well as some Afghan officials 
confirmed the existence of secret talks. Taking in consideration the trajectories of former 
‘peace initiatives’, it seems the reported current secret ‘peace talks’ will be hampered by the 
same question which derailed its predecessors: the problem of ‘negotiating the non-
negotiable’. Despite the change of government from Karzai to NUG, there is not much change 
in the basic determinants: The Taliban - in spite of the advent of the rival Islamic State (IS) in 
Afghanistan - are getting stronger and having more territory under its control; the international 
community, in spite of its financial promises, is reducing its engagement in the country; the 
current NGU suffers from severe rifts. Most importantly, the demands of the Taliban as 
preconditions for peace and reconciliation are illusory and unrealizable.  
However, based on the naive illusion that one can negotiate and implement an agreement in a 
sustainable manner with ideologically indoctrinated fundamentalists, the aforementioned 
negotiated deal with the politician and warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar seems to give the NUG 
and the US the semblance of some room to restart negotiations with the Taliban. Here, we can 
find one of the most disturbing features of the whole issue: the notion that the Taliban are 
willing to participate as a trustworthy stakeholder in the political-administrative system of 
Afghanistan. Otherwise we have also a deliberate or unintended forgetfulness of Taliban’s 
untrustworthiness for keeping agreements as well as its adamant ideological Jihadist mind-set. 
One must recall that the Taliban movement is anti-democratic in nature and against each 
governance structure which is not in line with their narrow interpretation of Islam and Sharia 
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law. The Taliban categorically reject democracy, negotiations and especially consensus-based 
political decision-making. In other words, deliberative political processes requiring 
compromises and opening exceptions are excluded from the fundamentalist Taliban mentality. 
Extremist ideologies do not allow room for dissensions. Disagreements and disputes, which 
are inherent to the democratic process, are seen as a threat that can weaken the power and 
efficiency of the ideology that holds the Taliban together. The movement experienced this 
situation already after the death of Mullah Omar. It resulted in heavy infighting. Therefore, 
democratic competition would deteriorate the movement’s coherence and promote 
fragmentation. For the Taliban, it is both in its nature and is a survival condition to dismiss 
democracy. 
Taking the recent military activities into account - namely including the second major attack 
on the northern city Kunduz and military activities against Lashkar Gah (provincial capital of 
southern Helmand province) - one shall conclude that the Taliban are not interested in any 
political reconciliation and integration. Instead, forced assimilation, humiliation, oppression 
and elimination, continue to be the trademark of the Taliban in areas under their occupation. 
Summing up, the fact that the Taliban are not seriously interested in sustainable peace turns a 
future ‘non-war’ scenario in Afghanistan unlikely. 
Further to this, the crux of the matter is that the Taliban understand ‘talks’ not as ‘peace 
negotiations’ but rather as a tool to broaden the armed struggle. The talks are seen as an 
extension of their militant activities into the political arena. In other words, the current round 
of ‘secret peace talks’ is interpreted by the Taliban as an additional opportunity to undermine 
Afghanistan’s democracy from within and to push their Islamic fundamentalist agenda in the 
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political-administrative structure. The tremendous rise of highly radicalized Islamist clerics in 
the Afghan state and society during the last years prepared the ground for the Taliban to regain 
political leverage.  
Therefore, after being ostracised by the international community for a long time, the Doha 
office and the respective talks have given the Taliban legitimacy as a political actor in its own 
right, not only domestically but also internationally. The NUG and the US should understand 
that when Taliban use political instruments this does not mean that they will stop their armed 
operations against the Afghan state and its people as well as the remaining foreign troops. This 
is rather seen as ‘double approach’: combining military with political methods in order to 
regain power in the country. 
Some would say, however, that the Taliban attach more weight to talks then they did three 
years ago. We believe the initial willingness of the Jihadists to join talks was a political feint. 
The current demise of the NUG and the rising ‘democratic apathy’ among the Afghan people 
may have given the Jihadists, however, the option of co-option of the political establishment 
and arena. The presence of Mullah’s Omar son Mohammad Yaqoob as well as his brother and 
former Taliban chief Mullah Abdul Manan Akhund may indicate a will to give more 
credibility to the talks and can also be seen as an indication  of a co-option of the ‘political 
establishment strategy’. Participation of the Taliban in secret or open peace talks shall not be 
necessary seen as a political decoy but rather as a strategy to prepare the ‘war from within the 
institutional system’ in Afghanistan.  
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